James M. Cameron was the top drug prosecutor in Maine until last spring when he came under investigation for trafficking in child pornography.Bangor Daily News: Ex-Maine drug prosecutor pleads not guilty to child porn (February 17, 2009)

Cameron was indicted on February 11, 2009, on 16 counts for transporting, receiving and possessing child pornography.Bangor Daily News: Ex-Maine drug prosecutor pleads not guilty to child porn (February 17, 2009)

1. Born: about 1962Maine Today: Former prosecutor indicted on child porn charges (February 17, 2009)
2. Family: Married with two teenage daughtersKennebec Journal: Attorney for fired prosecutor calls porn allegations bogus (May 3, 2008)
3. Hired in 1990Kennebec Journal: Attorney for fired prosecutor calls porn allegations bogus (May 3, 2008)
4. Employed as assistant attorney generalBangor Daily News: Ex-Maine drug prosecutor pleads not guilty to child porn (February 17, 2009)
5. Fired in April 2008Maine Today: Former prosecutor indicted on child porn charges (February 17, 2009)
6. Arraigned on 16 countsMaine Today: Former prosecutor indicted on child porn charges (February 17, 2009)
7. First appearance in federal court February 17, 2009Maine Today: Former prosecutor indicted on child porn charges (February 17, 2009)
8. Pleaded not guiltyMaine Today: Former prosecutor indicted on child porn charges (February 17, 2009)
9. Is alleged to have uploaded images of child pornography to the InternetBangor Daily News: Ex-Maine drug prosecutor pleads not guilty to child porn (February 17, 2009)
10. Also alleged to have transmitted digital images using Google HelloBangor Daily News: Ex-Maine drug prosecutor pleads not guilty to child porn (February 17, 2009)
11. Crime is alleged to have occurred between July 2006 and January 2008Bangor Daily News: Ex-Maine drug prosecutor pleads not guilty to child porn (February 17, 2009)
12. Bail set at $75,000, released to his brother's custodyBangor Daily News: Ex-Maine drug prosecutor pleads not guilty to child porn (February 17, 2009)
13. Faces between 5-20 years in federal prison and maximum fine of $250,000Bangor Daily News: Ex-Maine drug prosecutor pleads not guilty to child porn (February 17, 2009)

James M. Cameron was an assistant attorney general for Maine, who prosecuted several important drug cases, when he is alleged to have possessed and transmitted child pornography images via the Internet. Prosecutors allege that between July 2006 and January 2008, Cameron uploaded child pornography to a Yahoo photo album using five different aliases. He is also accused of uploading images to Google Hello, an Internet-based file sharing service.Bangor Daily News: Ex-Maine drug prosecutor pleads not guilty to child porn (February 17, 2009)

In April 2008, Cameron was fired from his job, after a story appeared in the local paper alleging his investigation for child pornography. Cameron was inndicted on 16 charges of trafficking in child pornography on February 17, 2009. He pleaded not guilty, and his attorney Peter Rodman said if there were images on his computer, Cameron was not aware of them. Authorities did not say if the images were on his home or work computer.Bangor Daily News: Ex-Maine drug prosecutor pleads not guilty to child porn (February 17, 2009)

Cameron reviewed several books on Amazon.com, including several true crime novels, a prison novel, a book about the rape and murder of an adolescent, and a digital camera.Amazon.com: Reviews Written by James M. Cameron RSS Feed (Hallowell, ME USA)

"If there ever is a case against Jim Cameron, I think it's going to be a textbook example of how you can get stuff on your hard drive you don't know is there. James Cameron has never knowingly possessed child pornography. He doesn't like child pornography. He hasn't solicited it and I don't think any investigation would ever show that."—Cameron's attorney Peter Rodway Kennebec Journal: Attorney for fired prosecutor calls porn allegations bogus (May 3, 2008)

Judge delays ex-prosecutor’s child porn trial— The federal trial of a former state prosecutor charged with downloading child pornography on his home computer has been delayed while his new attorney familiarizes himself with the case. U.S. Magistrate Judge Margaret Kravchuk on Monday appointed Michael Cuniff of Portland to represent James Cameron, 47, of Hallowell after his previous attorney withdrew from the case for reasons not outlined in court documents. The judge also delayed the start of Cameron’s trial from April 6 until July, although it’s unlikely to be held before September. Cameron retained his previous attorney, Peter Rodway of Portland, more than two years ago when the then-head drug prosecutor for the Maine Attorney General’s Office learned he was being investigated. Efforts to reach Cuniff and Rodway were unsuccessful Monday. It is the practice of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which is prosecuting Cameron, not to comment on cases until they have been concluded. Last month, the judge granted Cameron’s request that his bail be modified so he could return home to Hallowell. The defendant had been living with his brother in their native Michigan for more than two years, since his computers were taken from his home in December 2007 by federal investigators. Computers from Cameron’s home were seized after an Internet service provider reported it had discovered images of child pornography downloaded by an e-mail address traced to Cameron’s residence, according to court documents. The seizure of the computers triggered a possible investigation by the Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Rodway said at Cameron’s arraignment on Feb. 17, 2009. As a result, Cameron left the home he shared with his wife and children and moved to his brother’s home in Westland, Mich., a Detroit suburb. The couple, according to court documents, has a son and a daughter, who were full-time students when the investigation began. The children’s ages are not listed in court documents. The children most likely have turned 18 or DHHS has decided they are not at risk if they live with their father. Cameron was released to the custody of his brother Daniel Cameron on $75,000 unsecured bail after the former Maine assistant attorney general pleaded not guilty to 16 counts of transporting, receiving and possessing child pornography between July 10, 2006, and Jan. 26, 2008. That custody was transferred last month to Cameron’s wife, Barbara Cameron. The defendant’s bail conditions, including wearing an electronic monitor and having limited use of the Internet, remain in place. If convicted, he faces a minimum of five years but not more than 20 years in federal prison and a fine of up to $250,000. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JAMES M. CAMERON )
) CR-09-24-B-W ) ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT
The Court denies the Defendant?s motion to dismiss counts of the Indictment. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS On February 11, 2009, a federal grand jury issued a sixteen count indictment against James M. Cameron, alleging violations of federal criminal statutes against the possession, transportation, and receipt of child pornography. Indictment (Docket # 3). On May 18, 2009, Mr. Cameron moved to dismiss various counts of the Indictment. Mot. to Dismiss Counts of the Indictment (Docket # 28) (Def.’s Mot.). The Government responded on July 1, 2009. Gov’t’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Docket # 46) (Gov’t’s Mem.). Mr. Cameron replied on July 30, 2009. Def.’s Reply Mem. to Gov’t’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Docket # 55) (Def.’s Reply).
Mr. Cameron?s motion contains allegations of insufficient pleadings, multiplicitous and duplicitous pleadings, and improper venue. Specifically, Mr. Cameron argues that all sixteen counts of the Indictment should be dismissed for insufficient pleading; counts ten, fifteen, and sixteen should be dismissed as multiplicitous; count six should be dismissed as duplicitous; and, counts twelve, thirteen, and sixteen should be dismissed for improper venue. II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard Unlike civil actions, a criminal action, particularly one initiated by an indictment, is not generally subject to dispositive motion practice. United States v. Stevens, 578 F. Supp. 2d 172, 177 (D. Me. 2009). This is in part due to the fact that in returning an indictment, a grand jury is carrying out a constitutional function enshrined in the Bill of Rights. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury”). Because dismissing an indictment “directly encroaches upon the fundamental role of the grand jury,” the power of the Court to dismiss an indictment is reserved for extremely limited circumstances, Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1359 (1st Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Edgar, 82 F.3d 499, 506 (1st Cir. 1996), and is exercised with caution. United States v. Thomas, 519 F. Supp. 2d 141, 143-44 (D. Me. 2007). B. Insufficient Pleadings Mr. Cameron moves to dismiss all counts of the Indictment arguing that the Indictment does not adequately apprise him of the charges against him as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7. Specifically, Mr. Cameron alleges that because the Indictment does not identify the “images that the grand jury found probable cause to believe were child pornography,” he has not been placed on notice as to the specific images against which he must defend. Def.’s Mot. at 2. Rule 7(c)(1) states that the indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1). An indictment “is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” Hamling v. 2 United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); United States v. Vega Molina, 407 F.3d 511, 527 (1st Cir. 2005). Although the Government has not identified a specific image with each count, such specificity is not an element of the offense and neither the statute under which Mr. Cameron has been charged nor the Rule requires its inclusion. In United State v. Poulin, 588 F. Supp. 2d 64, 66 (D. Me. 2009), the defendant similarly alleged that an indictment charging sexual exploitation of a minor was insufficient because it did identify the sexually explicit image or group of images that formed the basis of the prosecution.1 Although this information was not included in the Poulin indictment, the Court concluded that the indictment, which included that date of the offense, the place of the offense, the specific nature of the crime, the statute under which the defendant was charged, and the applicable penalty provision, was sufficient. Id. at 67. The Court further stated that the “open-file” discovery employed by the government obviated the need for greater specificity. Id. (quoting United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1192-93 (1st Cir. 1993)). Here, each count of the Indictment meets the specificity requirement outlined by the Rule and the First Circuit. For example, count one alleges the offense of transporting child pornography in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1) and 2256(8)(A). In the Indictment, the Government includes similar language from section 2252A(a)(1), and states the type of child pornography (digital images), the means by which the images were transported (by computer using the screen name caitlinsadoll69), where the digital images were stored (a Yahoo photo album), the date the offense occurred (July 10, 2006), and the statutory provision that was violated. The remaining counts contain similar information—that is, a 1 Mr. Poulin filed a motion for bill of particulars, which calls for a slightly different, but substantially similar analysis. United States v. Poulin, 88 F. Supp. 2d 64, 66 (D. Me. 2009). 3 description of the offense using language from the appropriate statute, the date of the offense, the type of images, and the means by which the transportation, receipt, or possession occurred (uploading into a Yahoo photo album, or communicating via Google Hello or Yahoo e-mail). In addition, counts one through six, twelve, and fourteen allege that the Defendant used a particular screen name. Each count tracks the language of the statute and clearly sets forth the elements of the offense. This is sufficient.2 See United States v. Serino, 835 F.2d 924, 929 (1st Cir. 1987) (“„It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself,? as long as those words set forth the elements of the offense without any uncertainty and ambiguity.”) (quoting Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117). Because the Indictment “elucidates the elements of the crime[s], enlightens [the] defendant as to the nature of the charge[s] against which [he] must defend, and enables [him] to plead double jeopardy in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense[s]”, the Indictment complies with the Rule and any constitutional requirements. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1192 (1st Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Brown, 295 F.3d 152, 156 (1st Cir. 2002). C. Multiplicitous Next, Mr. Cameron makes the argument that possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5), is a lesser included offense of receiving of receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), and transporting child pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1). He claims 2 Even if the individual counts of the Indictment had failed to include an element of the offense, that omission alone is not sufficient grounds for dismissal. See United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 310-12 (1st Cir. 2000). The Indictment adequately describes the charges against Mr. Cameron and the conduct that resulted in the charges; Mr. Cameron has not been prejudiced by the lack of fair notice. See United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 894 (1st Cir. 1993). In addition, the Government has acted pursuant to an open file discovery practice, and asserts that it has provided to Mr. Cameron all discoverable material in its possession in accordance with Rule 16. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; Gov’t’s Mem. at 3 n.2. To the extent that Mr. Cameron is uncertain as to what images he has been charged with transporting, receiving, and possessing, he has a right to pursue this issue separately. 4 that the possession counts (counts fifteen and sixteen)3 are therefore multiplicitous of the transportation counts (counts one through six, eight, eleven, twelve, and fourteen) and the receipt counts (counts seven, nine, ten, and thirteen). “An indictment is multiplicitous and in violation of the Fifth Amendment?s Double Jeopardy Clause if it charges a single offense in more than one count.” United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 422 (1st Cir. 1994). “[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Appling the Blockburger standard “[a] defendant may be charged with multiple offenses based on the same underlying conduct as long as each offense requires proof of an element not required by the other.” United States v. Vartanian, 245 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has stated that for purposes of proceeding with prosecution, the Government may charge a defendant under two different statutes even when the same conduct is implicated in both offenses. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 860 n.7 (1985) (stating that “the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no prohibition to simultaneous prosecutions” of the same conduct under two different statutes). Absent a specific image, the Court cannot now determine whether the counts that allege possession of child pornography are lesser included offenses of the counts that allege the receipt or the transportation of child pornography; however, it is permissible for the Government to charge the possession offenses as counts separate from the 3 In Mr. Cameron?s motion, count ten is included as a possession count, but count ten involves receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), not possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). 5 receipt and transportation counts.4 In addition, the Indictment alleges that the possession offenses occurred on December 21, 2007 and January 26, 2008, and that the receipt and transportation offenses occurred on different dates. The Indictment is not mutiplicitous. D. Duplicitous With regard to count six, Mr. Cameron argues that he has been charged with two different criminal acts, the transportation of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) and the transmission or distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), in one count. He contends that count six is therefore duplicitous and should be dismissed. “A count is duplicitous when it charges more than one offense in a single count.” United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original). Whether the actions to which the count referred could have been charged as a separate crime is irrelevant. Id. An indictment is not duplicitous when it alleges alternative means of committing a single crime. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991). Contrary to Mr. Cameron?s argument, the Government has not charged Mr. Cameron with transporting child pornography and distributing child pornography in count six. Rather, the Government has merely alleged two ways in which Mr. Cameron could have committed one offense. Mr. Cameron is alleged to have transported child pornography, in violation of 18 M.R.S. § 2252A(a)(1) by: uploading digital images to a Yahoo photo album, and transmitting the images using Google Hello. The Government is not required to specify in the Indictment which 4 The First Circuit has not ruled on whether, in the context of child pornography cases, possession is a lesser included offense of transportation or receipt. There is some authority that convictions of receiving and possessing the same image constitute double jeopardy. See United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 76 (2nd Cir. 2009). This is an issue, however, that the Court cannot resolve on a motion to dismiss. 6 of the two means, uploading or transmitting, the crime of transporting child pornography was committed. Schad, 501 U.S. at 631. Count six?s allegation of transportation is permissible. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) ( “A count may allege that... the defendant committed [the offense] by one or more means.”). Furthermore, count six cites 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) and tracks its language. Count six is not duplicitous. E. ImproperVenue Mr. Cameron?s final argument is that counts twelve, thirteen, and sixteen of the Indictment should be dismissed for improper venue. He alleges that he was not present in the state of Maine on the dates these offenses were alleged to have occurred and he could not have committed the offenses alleged in the Indictment. The Government need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that venue is proper in the district in which the indictment was returned. United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2001). The determination of proper venue in a criminal case requires a determination of where the crime was committed. Fed. R. Crim. P. 18; United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958). “[W]here a crime consists of distinct parts which have different localities the whole may be tried where any part can be proved to have been done.” United States v. Lombaro, 241 U.S. 73, 77 (1916). In such instances, venue is proper in any district in which the offense was started, continued, or completed. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a); United States v. Rodriquez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279-81 (1999). The fact that Mr. Cameron claims to have been out of state on these dates may ultimately provide a defense to these charges, but it does not preclude a finding that venue in the district of Maine is proper. The Indictment contains allegations connecting the criminal activity forming the basis of this Indictment - uploading, storing, or sharing illegal images - with IP addresses 7 associated with the Cameron residence in Hallowell, Maine. The Indictment alleges that the computers seized from the Defendant?s Maine residence contained evidence of illegal activity. Accordingly, the images moved into Maine at some point and venue in this district is proper. See United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009) (for purposes of child pornography offenses, venue is appropriate in the jurisdiction into which the images moved); see also United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 895 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“Receipt of electronic transmissions in a district is sufficient to establish venue activity there.”). III.
CONCLUSION The Court DENIES the Defendant?s Motion to Dismiss Counts of the Indictment (Docket # 28). SO ORDERED. Dated this 25nd day of September, 2009 Defendant (1) JAMES M CAMERON Plaintiff USA /s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr. JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE represented by PETER E. RODWAY RODWAY & HORODYSKI 30 CITY CENTER PORTLAND , ME 04104 773-8449 Email: rodlaw@maine.rr.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Designation: Retained represented by GAIL FISK MALONE OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY DISTRICT OF MAINE 202 HARLOW STREET, ROOM 111 8 BANGOR , ME 04401 945-0344 Email: gail.f.malone@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED DONALD E. CLARK U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DISTRICT OF MAINE 100 MIDDLE STREET PLAZA PORTLAND , ME 04101 (207) 780-3257 Email: donald.clark@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) v. JAMES M. CAMERON ) ) CR-09-24-B-W ) ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND A HEARING ON ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL The Court dismisses without prejudice the Government?s motion for reconsideration and a hearing on its order appointing counsel to represent the Defendant. The Court concludes that in the circumstances of this case, the Government?s motion would constitute a diversion from the main task before the Court and that the issues the Government is pressing are better addressed later. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Procedural History On December 21, 2007, James Cameron became aware that he was the target of a child pornography investigation when state law enforcement agents executed a search warrant of his home in Hallowell, Maine. Order on Mot. for Disc., to Show Cause, and Vindictive Prosecution at 7-8 (Docket # 73) (describing the events leading up to and including the execution of the search warrant). Shortly thereafter, he retained Peter Rodway as his attorney. Mot. for Disc., to Show Cause, and Vindictive Prosecution at 8 (Docket # 29). On February 11, 2009, in a sixteen count indictment, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Cameron charging him with possession, receipt, or transportation of child pornography. Indictment. Mr. Rodway filed a flurry of motions, which were briefed by counsel and resolved by Order. On January 4, 2010, the Court set the trial of the case for April 10, 2010. Order (Docket # 101). On February 26, 2010, Attorney Rodway moved to withdraw as Mr. Cameron?s defense counsel. Mot. to Withdraw (Docket # 109). On March 5, 2010, the Magistrate Judge after a hearing granted the motion to withdraw and ruled that Mr. Cameron qualified for appointment of counsel. Order on Mot. to Withdraw and for Appointment of Counsel (Docket # 116). Mr. Cameron filed a financial affidavit, which the Court reviewed, and based on its contents, on March 8, 2010, the Court approved his request for appointed counsel, and appointed Attorney Michael Cunniff to represent the Defendant. Financial Decl. (Docket # 118). Trial is currently scheduled for the June term of Court. B. The Government’s Motion On March 16, 2010, the Government moved for reconsideration of the Court Order appointing defense counsel to represent Mr. Cameron.1 Gov’t’s Mot. for Recon. and a Hearing on Order Appointing Counsel (Docket # 120) (Gov’t’s Mot.). The Government noted that Mr. Cameron submitted an affidavit that revealed: In the declaration, the defendant represented that he was divorced, residing at the marital residence, employed by “Arrow Jewelry Finding, LLC” of West Bloomfield, Michigan, and had net monthly wages of about $2,200. He claimed that he had a “Life Estate (non-assignable) in 3 season cottage,” and a 1999 Audi worth $1,500. He disclosed about $30,000 in credit card debt, and about $1,200 in monthly credit card payments. He listed household expenses of $500 for groceries and $940 for insurance “for wife and 2 children and self.” He claimed no pension income or other assets. Id. at 2. The Government proffered that at a hearing, it would offer the following: 1) TheJudgmentofDivorcedatedFebruary10,2010betweentheDefendantand his wife awarded Mr. Cameron?s interest in their Hallowell residence to his wife; 1 The Government has standing to raise this issue. United States v. Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 662 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Szypt, 253 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D. Me. 2008). 2 2) Mr.Cameron?sinterestinrealpropertyinRome,Maine(the3seasoncottage) was awarded to both Mr. Cameron and his wife. Attached to the Judgment was a proposed deed conveying Mr. Cameron?s fee interest in the property to his wife, but reserving a life estate to him for “the right of possession and occupancy” “during the full term of his natural life”; 3) Mr. Cameron?s gross income was $25,000 and his wife?s was $45,000; 4) Mr.Cameronreceived“allfurniture,furnishings,andhouseholdgoods”atthe Rome, Maine property and he was required to pay “property taxes, liability and fire insurance” and to maintain the property; 5) Mr.Cameronwasrequiredtopayhealthinsuranceintheamountof$250per month for his daughter until April 30, 2010; 6) Mr. Cameron transferred to his wife thirty-five percent interest in Arrow Jewelry Findings, LLC; 7) The assessed value of the Hallowell residence is $174,600, which is encumbered by a mortgage that his wife agreed to pay; 8) The assessed value of the Rome, Maine property is $141,000; 9) NoquitclaimdeedhasbeenfiledontheRome,Mainepropertyconfirmingthe life estate provision of the divorce judgment; and, 10)Mr. Cameron failed to include any pension assets or allocation from the Maine Attorney General?s Office, a place he worked for approximately ten years. Id. at 3-5. The Government asks the Court to reconsider its finding that Mr. Cameron qualifies for court appointed counsel. Id. at 8. II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standards The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Facing charges that potentially impose lengthy terms of incarceration, James Cameron has the right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 3 (1963). To secure Mr. Cameron?s right to counsel, Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (CJA),18 U.S.C. § 3006A, which authorizes the district court to appoint counsel for an eligible defendant “if satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the person is financially unable to obtain counsel.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b); see United States v. O’Clair, 451 F.2d 485, 486 (1st Cir. 1971) (stating that the “purpose of the Criminal Justice Act is to furnish counsel to indigent defendants who, presumably, need counsel”). The fundamental purpose of the law is “to implement the guarantees of the sixth amendment to the Constitution by assuring to individuals accused of crime in a federal venue the availability of competent counsel to „furnish[] representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation.?” United States v. Carnevale, 624 F. Supp. 381, 383 (D.R.I. 1985) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)). Once a defendant is informed of his right to counsel, the Criminal Justice Act “requires the court to make an appropriate inquiry into the defendant?s criminal status to determine whether the defendant is entitled to appointed counsel.” United States v. Foster, 867 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1989). The burden, however, rests on the defendant to “establish insufficient financial means to employ counsel.” Id. Though the term “indigency” is often used as shorthand, the statutory standard is a defendant?s “financial inability” to obtain counsel, a “less stringent requirement than . . . indigency.” Id. at 839; United States v. de Hernandez, 745 F.2d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 1984). In the context of the right to appointed counsel, “financial inability” is a “relative concept.” Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 289 n.7 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). In United States v. Barcelon, the Tenth Circuit catalogued some factors courts typically examine in addition to the defendant?s assets, liabilities, income, and obligations: Other factors which courts have considered include: the needs of the defendant and his family, United States v. Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 661 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 4 464 U.S. 997, 78 L. Ed. 2d 688, 104 S. Ct. 495 (1983); U.S. v. Bracewell, 569 F.2d 1194, 1200 (2nd Cir. 1978); the amount the defendant posted as bail, see VII Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures: Appointment of Counsel in Criminal Cases para. 2.04 at 2-11 (1987); the expense and extent of legal services which the defendant requires, Harris, 707 F.2d at 661, United States v. Coniam, 574 F. Supp. 615, 618 (D. Conn. 1983); United States v. Hennessey, 575 F. Supp. 119, 121 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d 751 F.2d 372 (2nd Cir. 1984); amounts given the defendant by others for limited purposes only, Bridges v. United States, 588 F.2d 911, 912 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bursey, 515 F.2d 1228, 1236 (5th Cir. 1975); whether the defendant has secreted assets, United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 964 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850, 97 S. Ct. 139, 50 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1976); United States v. Schmitz, 525 F.2d 793, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1975); and the availability of income to the defendant from other sources such as a spouse, United States v. Caudle, 758 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1985), or trusts, estates or the like. See, e.g., United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 39 L. Ed. 2d 297, 94 S. Ct. 1179 (1974); Schmitz, 525 F.2d at 794-95. In addition to these factors the court may also refuse to appoint counsel if it finds that the defendant's portrayal of financial inability lacks credibility. See United States v. Binder, 794 F.2d 1195, 1202 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869, 107 S. Ct. 234, 93 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1986); United States v. Kelly, 467 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Martinez- Torres, 556 F. Supp. 1275, 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Wright, 478 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 833 F.2d 894, 897 (10th Cir. 1987). B. Mr. Cameron’s Financial Ability If it is accurate, Mr. Cameron?s financial affidavit is sufficient to sustain his burden that he is entitled to appointment of counsel. The Government?s contention is that it is not accurate. The Government asserts that Mr. Cameron may have a continuing interest in the Hallowell residence and in the Rome property that have not been fully or accurately disclosed. It also questions whether he has an interest in a state pension not revealed in his financial affidavit. The Court defers ruling for a number of reasons. First, it notes that Mr. Cameron was employed as an Assistant Attorney General for the state of Maine for approximately ten years prior to December 2007, earning a comparatively modest salary. There is no suggestion that Mr. Cameron worked in an area of law that would be especially lucrative, or that his past work history would indicate the accumulation of substantial financial resources. Second, Mr. 5 Cameron retained and paid his own private attorney for the period from December 2007 to just this month, and during this interval, his former attorney actively pursued his defense. Mr. Cameron?s defense to date likely had a significant impact on whatever extra money he had saved. Third, now that his private attorney has been allowed to withdraw, if Mr. Cameron hired his own replacement counsel, the new lawyer would be required to start again, generating substantial billable hours to familiarize himself or herself with the case in order to match the prosecutors? current knowledge. Fourth, to defend a charge of possession of child pornography is a high stakes, time intensive, technical, and intricate matter, and the new attorney faces the prospect of a period of focused dedication, which would translate into high legal fees. Fifth, if the case proceeds to trial, the defense lawyer will be required to spend an inordinate amount of time attempting to match the prosecutorial resources of the Government. Sixth, taking the $125 maximum hourly rate for panel counsel as a proxy, a diligent defense lawyer will in no short time accumulate significant time and expense. Finally, because of the technical nature of a child pornography case, the defense will likely be required to seek out and secure the services of one or more computer expert to review the Government?s evidence and suggest possible technical defenses. These experts are expensive. All of this makes it unlikely in the Court?s view that even if the allegations of the Government were substantiated, Mr. Cameron could long continue to pay his new defense lawyer with the assets the Government claims he retains. Thus, in reasonably short order, Mr. Cameron could be back before the court asking yet again for newly appointed defense counsel. The Court is determined to move this criminal case to fruition. Mr. Cameron has lived under a shadow of investigation for an extremely serious crime since December 2007; he has been under indictment for over a year. Criminal cases rarely age well. Witnesses die, become ill 6 or move away, evidence gets lost, memories fade; all of which is why there is a Speedy Trial Act. The case is currently scheduled for trial in June. If the Court were to grant the Government?s request for a hearing, the efforts of the newly-appointed defense lawyer would be diverted to defending the merits of the motion, not the merits of the indictment. This would enhance the likelihood that the resolution of this long-pending criminal matter would be further delayed. Further, an exploration of Mr. Cameron?s assets could well involve discovery, controversy, and delay, and would be a serious diversion from the main task of just appointed defense counsel. Further, the resolution of this controversy would present a considerable distraction for Mr. Cameron himself as he assists in his own defense. The prospect of delay and diversion is especially problematic here, since Mr. Cameron?s financial situation has been made manifestly more complicated by his recent divorce and the Government?s seeming contention that the divorce judgment does not accurately reflect the true state of Mr. Cameron?s finances. This does not mean that the Court has resolved whether Mr. Cameron is financially unable to pay defense counsel. The Guide to Judiciary Policy provides that “[a]ny doubts as to a person?s eligibility should be resolved in the person?s favor; erroneous determinations of eligibility may be corrected at a later time.” Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 7, Pt. A, Ch. 2, § 210.40.30(b). The question remains open. If the Defendant is convicted, whether he sequestered assets or misrepresented his financial condition could become an issue at sentencing. Id. § 210.40.30(d) (providing that prior to sentencing, the court should consider pertinent information “in order to make a final determination concerning whether the person then has funds available to pay for some or all of the costs of representation” and “should order the person to reimburse the CJA appropriation for such costs”). How the Barcelon factors would be applied in Mr. Cameron?s case depends on the evidence presented at the time. In any case, if the Government 7 believes that he committed perjury in signing and swearing to the financial affidavit, it could, if it elected to do so, pursue the matter separately. But, for now, the attention of the parties should be directed to the prosecution and defense of the merits of the pending indictment. III. CONCLUSION The Court DISMISSES without prejudice the Government?s Motion for Reconsideration and A Hearing on Order Appointing Counsel (Docket # 120). SO ORDERED. Dated this 18th day of March, 2010 Defendant (1) JAMES M CAMERON Plaintiff USA /s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr. JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR. CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE represented by PETER E. RODWAY RODWAY & HORODYSKI 30 CITY CENTER PORTLAND, ME 04104 773-8449 Email: rodlaw@maine.rr.com TERMINATED: 03/05/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Designation: Retained MICHAEL A. CUNNIFF MCCLOSKEY, MINA, CUNNIFF, & DILWORTH, LLC 12 CITY CENTER PORTLAND, ME 04101 207-772-6805 Fax: 207-879-9374 Email: mcunniff@lawmmc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Designation: CJA Appointment represented by GAIL FISK MALONE 8 9 OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY DISTRICT OF MAINE 202 HARLOW STREET, ROOM 111 BANGOR, ME 04401 945-0344 Email: gail.f.malone@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED DONALD E. CLARK U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DISTRICT OF MAINE 100 MIDDLE STREET PLAZA PORTLAND, ME 04101 (207) 780-3257 Email: donald.clark@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED JAMES L. MCCARTHY OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY DISTRICT OF MAINE 202 HARLOW STREET, ROOM 111 BANGOR, ME 04401 945-0344 Email: james.mccarthy@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 05/27/2009 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

 

Update June 30 2009

http://www.mpbn.net/News/MaineHeadlineNews/tabid/968/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3479/ItemId/12756/Default.aspx

http://www.kjonline.com/cameron-waives-jury-trial_2010-06-29.html

http://lawyergossip.com/2009/09/18/asst-attorney-general-indicted-for-child-porn/

http://www.onlinesentinel.com/news/child-porn-trial-to-resume-monday_2010-08-20.html

http://www.bostonherald.com/news/national/northeast/view/20100824child_porn_convictions_cap_downfall_of_maine_ex-prosecutor_james_m_cameron_guilty_on_13_of_the_15_counts/srvc=home&position=recent

http://lawyergossip.com/2009/09/18/asst-attorney-general-indicted-for-child-porn/

Let's see if he goes to a country club. I say put him in with the people he prosecuted for drugs.